

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO/SP		X		
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	D/SOVA		X		STAT
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

7 Mar 85

Date

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

Executive Registry

85- 984

March 6, 1985

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Our START Position for the First Round in Geneva

We begin the new START talks in fine shape. The Soviets came back to the table to discuss offensive nuclear arms as well as space issues, and we gave no concessions to get them back.

We have a sound framework and proposed START treaty already on the table and have highlighted our willingness to explore tradeoffs between areas of Soviet advantage and areas of US advantage. In this sense, we need not move much beyond our current position (Option 1 in the interagency study).

In another sense, however, we should be willing to present a "road map", as you mentioned in your UN address, on where we want deep reductions to take us. You have also said that we will have concrete ideas to discuss. We thus need to show some movement, although not much -- at least until we see if the Soviet leaders are really serious in START. They may not be. They may have all their guns focused on undercutting SDI.

My problem with most of the alternative options that go beyond our current position -- Options 2 to 5 in the interagency paper -- is that they all seek to present a blueprint before we have agreed on the type of building to construct. The other options focus on specific details of new or revised frameworks, specific units of account and systems.

We do not need to get immersed in those details at this stage. Taking one of those approaches would also get us on a specific track or framework, making it all the more difficult later to show flexibility and to explore other ways of accomplishing our goal of deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. Besides, John Tower should be given enough latitude to explore different ways of accomplishing this over-arching objective.

Therefore, I favor a strategy for START's first round based in effect on combining Option 1 (our current position) with Option 6 (a "road map" for meeting our objectives). This could be implemented as follows:



- o Reaffirm our basic START objectives, particularly significant reductions in the numbers and destructive capability of nuclear missiles, and our willingness to reduce bomber destructive capability as well.
- o Note that we have a sound proposal on the table and are willing to take it up at any time.
- o Stress our desire to focus at the outset on where we want to go, rather than on the many different roads we might take to get there. We can present the architectural goals without getting bogged down now in drafting blueprints.
- o Build on your September UN speech and illustrate our objectives by providing a long-term "road map" for where we want to go. This would call for a steady reduction in key measures of strategic power of about 5% per year.
- o Stress that we are flexible on how long we are willing to take for reductions to be achieved and on different ways in which tradeoffs can be made.
- o If the Soviets appear serious, explore possible ways for achieving these objectives including offsetting and unequal limits and different aggregation approaches (that is, the various frameworks of the other options), but without committing ourselves at this stage to any specific or particular framework.

This approach builds on our past proposals, focuses on our objectives, and avoids further commitment to specific tactical approaches until we see whether the Soviets are serious. Equally important, it does not tie the hands of our negotiator with only one tactic or approach, but rather gives him latitude to explore different tactics and approaches that head toward the same end. Finally, laying out a long-term "road map" fits well with your concept of a transition to a world where defenses play a more prominent role in our deterrent strategy.

Kenneth L. Adelman

Kenneth L. Adelman

cc: Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
✓ Mr. Casey
General Vessey
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Tower
Ambassador Glitman

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Executive Registry

85- ~~909~~ 912



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

February 28, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel R. J. Affourtit
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

[Redacted Box]

Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

25X1

BG George Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff

SUBJECT: Verification and START Alternatives

Director Adelman has asked that the attached ACDA/VI staff paper be forwarded for the SACG principals as it is relevant to the March 1 SACG meeting.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W. B. Staples', is positioned above the typed name.

William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated



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